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Midgett v. Sackett in the Aftermath
of Allis-Chalmers: The Impact of

Federal Labor Law on Retaliatory
Discharge Claims
I.

INTRODUCTION

Illinois courts have traditionally adhered to the common law principle that, in the absence of an employment contract which fixes the
employment duration, the employment relationship is terminable at
the will of either the employee or the employer.' Under this doctrine
of "at will" employment, an employer may discharge an employee
for any reason without incurring liability. 2 The employee is without
a remedy even if his discharge was unjust or morally wrong.'
However, in December, 1978, the Supreme Court of Illinois
created an exception to this principle of at will employment. For the
first time, the court recognized a cause of action in tort for at will
employees who claim to have been fired in retaliation of filing a
workers' compensation claim."

1. Where an employment contract is not intended to be for a fixed duration,
the general rule in Illinois has been that the employment relationship may be terminated
at the will of either party without giving a reason and without incurring liability.
Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 747 (1977). The termination "may
permissibly be for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all," and as such,
the court has no business rewriting an employment contract agreed to by the parties.
Isabelli v. Curtis 1000, Inc., 31 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 335 N.E.2d 538, 545 (1975). See
generally Grove, Garry, Employment-at- Will in Illinois; Implications and Anticipations for the Practitioner, 31 DEPAUL L. REv. 359 (1981-82); Comment, Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc.-A Remedy for the Abusively Discharged At Will Employee, S. ILL.
U.L.J. 563 (1979).
2. "[In this state the rule has long been established that a hiring at a monthly
or annual salary, if no period of duration is specified in the contract, is presumed
to be at will and either party may terminate the hiring at his pleasure without liability." Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill. App.2d 369, 373 (1959). The at will theory
of employment found constitutional support in Supreme Court holdings. In Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the Court held that to compel a person to
employ another, or to perform services for another, is repugnant to the Constitutional guarantee against deprivation of liberty or property without due process of
law. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
3. Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
4. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IIl. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). For a
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Creation of the new tort was a judicial response to the dilemma
of the injured employee threatened with discharge if he pursued his
statutory rights under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. An
at will employee who chose to retain his job would be forced to forego
his right to compensation for his injury under the Act.' If the employee
did exercise his right by filing a claim, he risked discharge.' If discharged, the at will employee would have no common law remedy,'
nor would he have a statutory remedy under the Act.' Hence, the
tort of retaliatory discharge provided a cause of action for the
wrongfully discharged at will employee who would otherwise be without
redress.
Grounds for a tort action were later extended to an at will
employee who claimed he was discharged in retaliation of reporting
suspected criminal conduct of a fellow employee. 9 In expanding the
grounds for the tort action, the court stated that a discharged
employee, in order to avail himself of the tort action, need only allege
that he was discharged for his activities, and that his discharge contravened a "clearly mandated public policy."'" Thus, the tort action
is not limited to employees discharged in retaliation of filing a claim
under workers' compensation; rather, the cause of action encompasses
any discharge which violates public policy.
Prior to 1984, all the employees granted this cause of action by
the court were employees at will. The courts' reasoning for making
this tort available to the at will employee was a recognition that such
employees are not in an equal bargaining position with the employer."
The employer may abuse his superior bargaining power by threatening the at will employee with discharge for any reason, including
reasons which violate public policy. Unless the employee is provided
legal redress against the employer, society's interest in the execution
of its public policies is threatened.' 2
comprehensive overview of judicial holdings regarding abusive discharge prior to
Kelsay, see Note, A Common Law Action of the Abusively Discharged Employee,
26 HASTINGs L.J. 1435 (1974-75).
5. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
6.Id.
7. See supra notes I and 2.
8. III. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.26 (1983). Violation of the Act is a petty offense.
No civil sanctions are provided.
9. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co:, 85 111. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981). See infra text accompanying notes 42-45.

10. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.

11. Id. at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
12. Id.
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The cause of action serves to deter the employer from discharging an employee for reasons which violate state public policy by enabling the at will employee, otherwise remediless, to hold the employer
liable in tort. Not only does the cause of action provide the at will
employee with legal recourse, but the remedy includes punitive as well
as compensatory damages, thereby providing a further deterrence for
retaliatory discharge.' 3
Although the court based its rationale for the creation of this
tort on the fact that an at will employee would otherwise be remediless,
the court nevertheless further expanded the class of potential plaintiffs to include employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement.' The Illinois Supreme Court in Midgett v. Sackett'" maintained
that a tort action, separate and distinct from any contractual remedies
provided by a collective bargaining agreement, was essential to provide complete relief to a victim of retaliatory discharge."
Midgett failed to adequately resolve a number of issues. For
example, what constitutes "clearly mandated public policy" in Illinois,
and who should determine such policy? Is a collective bargaining agreement, in fact, inadequate to protect a union member's rights, notwithstanding the availability of punitive damages to the at will
employee? How are a union member's interests compromised by a
requirement to resort in the first instance to the grievance procedure
as provided for by a bargaining agreement, at least for the purpose
of determining whether the discharge was for just cause? And most
importantly, where such an agreement exists, does federal labor policy,
which favors arbitration of labor disputes,"' preempt state courts'
jurisdiction in the first instance in resolving disputes covered by the
agreement?
This article will provide an overview of both legislative and judicial
13. Kelsay, 74 Ill.
2d at 186-89, 384 N.E.2d at 359-361.
14. Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 111. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3513 (1985).
15. Id.
16. Id.at 149, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. The court determined that the prospect
of punitive damages was essential in order to discourage employers from practicing
retaliatory discharge. The court felt that imposition of compensatory damages alone
was insufficient to quell such practice, which "mocks the public policy of the State."
Id.
17. "The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through
the collective bargaining agreement. . .. [Airbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process
itself." United States Steel Workers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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efforts at the state and federal levels to strike a balance in the bargaining strength between employers and employees.' 8 The propriety of
the Midgett decision will be discussed in light of the issues left unresolved, and in light of the decision's potentially adverse impact on
both the arbitration process and the economic climate of the State
of Illinois.
Further, cases subsequent to Midgett Will be examined and
analyzed in terms of their potential impact on the Midgett decision.
Also, the reasoning of those cases will be considered in order to suggest the possible outcome when the Illinois Supreme Court addresses
the issue of federal preemption of state retaliatory discharge claims.

II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The at will doctrine of employment remains the general rule in
Illinois.' 9 The Midgett decision merely represents a continuing effort
to balance the employers' interest in an efficient and profitable business
operation, against the employees' interest in securing a livelihood, and
society's interest in the effectuation of its public policies. 0
Prior to Midgett, the Illinois legislature had enacted statutes restricting the grounds for which an employer may discharge an employee.'
Such statutes make it unlawful to discharge an employee in retaliation of exercising rights granted by state age discrimination law,22
because of a handicap which does not affect the employee's ability
to perform his assigned tasks,2" or because an employee attempts to
exercise his rights under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 4

18. See MICHAEL L. CLOSEN, AGENCY, EMPLOYMENT, AND PARTNERSHIP LAW
310 (1984). Such efforts have occurred at the federal as well as the state level. For
instance, the National Labor Relations Act creates an exception to the at will doctrine of employment by making the discharge of an employee in retaliation for
participating in lawful "concerted" labor activities an unfair labor practice. National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 518(a)(1) and (3) (1982). This Act enunciates a
broad spectrum of employee rights, establishes a grievance procedure, creates the
National Labor Relations Board, and codifies sanctions for management of unfair
labor practices. See also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(recognizing the absolute right of employees to unionize free of intimidation); Title
7 also prohibits discharge from employment on account of an employee's race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982).
19. Palmateer, 85 111.2d at 142, 421 N.E.2d at 884. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
21. See infra notes 22-24.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68 §§ 1-103(Q) and 2-102(a) (1983).
23. Id.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138-4(h) (1983).
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Where retaliatory discharge is not covered by a statute, or where
state statutes have limited the employer's power to terminate the
employment relationship, but have provided criminal sanctions for
violations of its provisions, various state courts have felt the need
to provide civil sanctions. Consequently, a 1959 California decision
resulted in a judicially-created tort remedy for at will employees
wrongfully discharged in contravention of a public policy." This
California decision led a small minority of states, Illinois included,
to follow in expanding employees' rights, thereby curtailing employers'
discretion in at will termination of employees. The California District
Court of Appeals in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters" , made a finding of twofold significance: (1) the court
created a civil cause of.action for wrongful discharge which violates
a public policy, and (2) the court reaffirmed California's jurisdictional
rule that where contractual remedies exist, such remedies must be
exhausted prior to seeking redress from the tribunals. 7
Petermann was both a member of, and an employee of, the
Teamsters Union, having been hired as a business agent of the union. 8
When Petermann refused to commit perjury before a state legislative
committee at the direction of the union, the union discharged him
from his employment and issued to him an honorable withdrawal card
from union membership.29 As a result, Petermann alleged two causes
of action, one contending wrongful discharge and seeking accrued
salary, the other contending issuance of the withdrawal card to be
arbitrary and intentionally injurious. 0 The court noted that Petermann's contract did not contain a specified duration of employment,
and that such a relationship was generally terminable at will. However,
the court stated that the employer's unfettered right to discharge may
be limited by public policy, and that there is a strong public policy
against the commission of, or solicitation of, perjury. The court concluded that, "the civil law . . . must deny the employer his generally
unlimited right to discharge an employee whose employment is for
an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the
employee's refusal to commit perjury."'" The court held that Peter25. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.2d 184, 344
P.2d 25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1959).
26. Id.

27. Id.at 29.
28. Id.at 28.
29. Id.at 26.
30. Id.

31. Id.at 27.
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mann was entitled to civil relief for his wrongful discharge.3" However,
regarding the second alleged cause of action, the court held that Petermann had received the withdrawal card in his capacity as union
member, rather than as an employee, precluding him from seeking
redress in the courts without first exhausting the remedies available
to him under the union's constitution. Also noted was the long
established rule that a member of an organization must first exhaust
the remedies provided by the organization. This rule is based on a

practical approach to solving internal problems that arise between the
parties to the agreement. 3
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Illinois first recognized the tort
of retaliatory discharge in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc."' The court based
its creation of this civil cause of action on the grounds of public
policy," as had the California court in Petermann. In the course of
32. Id.at 28.
33. Id. at 29. This doctrine of exhaustion of remedies was articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery
and Confectionery Workers International, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). The Court stated
that "[Airbitration provisions, which themselves have not been repudiated, are meant
to survive breaches of contract, in many contexts, even total breach." Id. at 262.
The Court further noted the Congressional interest in enforcing collective bargaining
agreements and that this preferred method of dispute settlement was to be the vehicle
chosen by the parties to the agreement. The Court observed that the only way to
effectuate this policy was to give full play to the means chosen by the parties to
settle their differences under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 263. "A contrary rule which would permit an individual employee to completely sidestep available
grievance procedures in favor of a lawsuit has little to commend it." Republic Steel
v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965). "(lit is settled that the employee must at
least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established
in the bargaining agreement." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1976). If an employee,
wrongfully discharged, seeks redress in the courts prior to exhausting grievance procedures, the employer may assert the defense that the exclusive contractual remedies
have not been exhausted. This is because the employee's claim is founded upon a
breach of contract, and he is bound by its terms which govern the method in which
rights under the contract may be enforced. However, the employee need not exhaust
his contractual remedies if he "can prove that the union as bargaining agent breached
its duty of fair representation in its handling of the employee's grievance." Id. at
186. The Court defined such breach as occurring "only when a union's conduct
toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."
Id. at 190. On the other hand, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), the Court held that a discharged employee alleging racial discrimination was
not precluded from filing a suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
despite his submission of the matter to binding arbitration. The Court reasoned the
plaintiff was not seeking judicial review of the arbitrator's decision, but rather was
lawfully exercising a separate and independent statutory right.
34. 74 II1. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
35. Id. at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
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her employment at the Motorola plant, Kelsay injured her thumb,
which required stitches. Her plant manager informed her of a corporate policy of discharging employees who filed worker's compensation claims. When Kelsay told the 6manager of her decision to pursue the claim, she was discharged.1
The court pointed out that the employee's previous common law
rights to seek compensation for injuries had been completely replaced
by the rights and remedies provided by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 7 Under this new scheme, the employee relinquished
his rights to tort claims against his employer, and in return was assured
recovery on a fixed schedule for injuries received during the course
of employment, regardless of personal fault. The employer sacrificed
various defenses available at common law and was forced to compensate an injured employee, but his liability was statutorily limited
to a comprehensive injury schedule, shielding him from the sympathies
of compassionate jurors."
The court stated the purpose of this trade-off was to provide
employees with fair and prompt compensation for injuries, and hence,
its enactment furthered public policy. 3 9 The court determined that in
order to effectuate this public policy of insuring protection of
employees covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act, a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge was necessary.' 0 The Kelsay court held
punitive damages to be necessary as a deterrent to wrongful firings."'
In an effort to further define public policy, in Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co."2 the Illinois Supreme Court confronted the
question of whether there is a strong public policy favoring "whistleblowing."' 3 The plaintiff was discharged after disclosing to law enforcement authorities his suspicions of a co-worker's criminal
36. Id. at 178-79, 384 N.E.2d at 355-56.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138-1 (1983).
38. Kelsay at 180, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
39. Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
40. Id. In dissent, Justice Underwood, while conceding that the notion of compensatory damages for victims of retaliatory discharge seemed appealing, insisted
that the decision to make such damages available was the province of the legislature
and that the majority had simply substituted its own preference for the General

Assembly's judgment. Id. at 190, 384 N.E.2d at 361.

41. Id. at 186, 384 N.E.2d at 359.
42. 85 I1.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
43. Generally, the "whistle-blowing" exception to the at will doctrine arises
when an employee reports suspected illegal conduct by another employee to the company, or when he reports suspect company activity to a government agency. See
generally Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees from Unjust Dismissal:
A Statutory Proposal, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 111 (1982).
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activities." The court found his discharge contravened public policy
which favors investigation and prosecution of criminal activity."'
Most significantly, the court in Palmateer articulated a two-part
test for determining whether an aggrieved employee qualifies for relief

under the tort of retaliatory discharge. That test required that "the

employer discharge the employee in retaliation of the employee's
activities, and that the discharge be in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy."4 6
While public policy served as the grounds for the court to

recognize a tort cause of action in both Kelsay and Palmateer, in
both instances the aggrieved employees were at will. Thus, these decisions left unresolved the issue of whether such relief was to be limited

to employees at will, or extended to those employees covered by a
"just cause"" 7 provision in a collective bargaining agreement; and if
so, whether the exhaustion of remedies doctrine had application."
44. 85 Ill. 2d at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877.
45. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880.
46. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881.
47. Collective bargaining agreements seldom define "just cause". For an instructive sampling of various arbitrators' notions of the meaning of "just cause",
as well as a typical guideline used in determining whether a discharge was just, see
Hill, supra note 43 at 139-40 and n. 145.
48. Attempts to address this question have resulted in a number of conflicting
judicial decisions within various state and federal courts. See Raden v. City of Azusa,
97 Cal. App. 30336, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1979) (retaliatory firing for filing worker's
compensation claim-remedies held to be non-exclusive); Judson Steel Corp. v.
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 22 Cal. App. 3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150
Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978) (Supreme Court of California held that "bare assertion by
an interested party that certain conduct is within the scope of the [National Labor
Relations] Act is obviously insufficient to oust a state court of jurisdiction.") (quoting
United Farm Workers Organization Committee v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 556
at 564, 483 P.2d 1215 at 1221 (1971)); Puchert v. Agsalud, 677 P.2d 449 (Hawaii
1984) (Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the right of an employee, discharged as
a result of a work-related injury, to seek redress finds its source not in the collective
bargaining agreement, but in the state statute.); Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
114 Ill. App. 3d 396, 449 N.E.2d 203 (1983) (employee protected by collective bargaining agreement with a "just cause" provision could not bring an action for retaliatory
discharge.); Wyatt v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 108 111.
App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053
(1982) (extended tort cause of action to workers covered by collective bargaining
agreement fired for filing worker's compensation claim.); Deatrick v. Funk Seeds
International, 109 111.
App. 3d 998, 441 N.E.2d 669 (1982) (extended doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies to nonunion workers covered by collective bargaining agreement.); Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 I11.
App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980)
(court refused to extend Kelsay to cover union employees.); Lally v. Copygraphics
85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (New Jersey Supreme Court held a common law
action for discharge in response to a worker's compensation claim-statutory treat-
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Illinois joined a minority of states49 by resolving these issues in
favor of the employee. Thus, an employee covered by a collective
bargaining agreement may now bring a cause of action in tort for
retaliatory discharge, with the prospect of receiving punitive damages.
Furthermore, such an employee need not attempt to exhaust his contractual remedies, but may bring the tort action in court in the first
instance, thereby bypassing arbitration.
III.
A.

MIDGETT V. SACKETT

FACTS

In October, 1984, the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the
question of whether a union member, protected by a collective bargaining agreement containing a just cause provision, may bring a tort

action for retaliatory discharge, distintt from any contractual remedy. 0
In complaints filed separately, Terry Midgett, Jose Gonzalez and John
Repyak alleged unjust discharges by their employers in retaliation of

their filings of worker's compensation claims under the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act.'
All three complainants were union members covered by collective bargaining agreements containing specific grievance procedures

for arbitrating disputes. 2 Under these provisions, an arbitrator would
decide whether these discharges were for just cause."
Remarkably, none of these complaints were submitted to arbitrament did not preempt civil redress); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone
Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281 (1980) (Supreme Court of Oregon held that an
employee who was denied reinstatement following recovery from a work-related injury was not required to exhaust the contractual remedies in the collective bargaining agreement prior to seeking redress.); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450
(Tex. 1980) (Supreme Court of Texas held that an attempt to comply with a grievance
procedure in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement which does not result
in a settlement does not preclude the employee from filing suit under Texas statute).
See also Peabody Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
49. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1284, 1285 (1984). Judson, 22
Cal. App. 3d 658, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564 (1978); Puchert, 67 Hawaii
25, 677 P.2d 449; Vaughn, 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281; Carnation Co.,
__,
610 S.W.2d 450.

__

Tex.

50. Midgett, 105 111. 2d at 149, 473 N.E.2d at 1283.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 (1983).
52. Midgett belonged to the Production Workers Union of Chicago and Vicinity,
Local 707. Midgett v. Sackett, 118 111.App. 3d 7, 8, 454 N.E.2d 1092, 1093 (1983).
Gonzalez and Repyak were members of Laborer's Local No. 996, a bargaining unit
for maintenance and production employees. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3,
Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 118 I11. App. 3d 1167, 470 N.E.2d 663 (1983).
53. Midgett, 105 Iii. 2d at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
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tion as required by the collective bargaining agreements." None of
the complaints contained allegations of collusion between union and

employer."
The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissals of
Gonzalez's and Repyak's complaints,5 6 but the First District Appellate
Court reversed the dismissal of Midgett's." Recognizing a need to
resolve these conflicting appellate court decisions, the Supreme Court
of Illinois consolidated the cases for review."
B.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Ward, writing for the majority, began with a review of
the Kelsay rationale for justifying the availability of the tort claim

for the employee at will discharged in retaliation of filing a claim

under the Workmen's Compensation Act.'

54. Id.
55. Id. at 156, 473 N.E.2d at 1287. However, Midgett did allege collusion and
fraudulent misrepresentation between his union and employer, in opposition to
Sackett's motion to dismiss. Id. See infra note 67. Nonetheless, Midgett's complaint
as well as those of Gonzalez and Repyak were dismissed by the trial courts. Id.
at 147, 473 N.E.2d at 1281.
56. Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 118 Ill.
App. 3d 1167, 470 N.E.2d
663 (1983). The Court reasoned that because Gonzalez and Repyak were union
members covered by a collective bargaining agreement, and because the tort remedy
for retaliatory discharge had been afforded to an at will employee in Kelsay, 74
Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, Gonzalez and Repyak were required to exhaust the
grievance remedies provided by the agreement. Id. at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
57. Midgett v. Sackett, 118 Ill.
App. 3d 7, 454 N.E.2d 1092 (1983). The court
rejected the employer's argument that permitting litigation in the first instance would
undermine federal labor policy. Id. at 9, 454 N.E.2d at 1094. The court based its
holding on the Illinois Supreme-Court decision in Palmateer which expanded the
availability of a cause of action in tort for retaliatory discharge where strong public
policies are involved. Id. See supra text accompanying note 46.
"We reject defendants' contention that such a determination tends to undermine the federal labor policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes covered
by collective bargaining agreements, as expressed in United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). On the
contrary, the recognition of a cause of action in tort merely allows an
employee an additional remedy in areas where strong public policies, as
opposed to purely private interests, are involved."
Midgett, 118 Ill.
App. 3d at 9, 454 N.E.2d at 1094.
58. Midgett, 105 Il1. 2d at 146, 473 N.E.2d at 1282.
59. Id. at 148, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. The purpose of the remedy is to dissuade
employers from threatening their employees with job termination in an effort to force
employees to forego rights provided by the Act. Kelsay, 74 Ill.
2d at 178, 384 N.E.2d
at 357.

1986:347]

RETALIATORY DISCHARGE CLAIMS

The court discounted defendants' argument that Kelsay and
Palmateer, which involved employees at will, did not apply to the

present case, where employees were covered by collective bargaining
agreements containing just cause provisions and providing grievance
procedures." It was noted that the remedies traditionally available

to a wrongfully discharged employee who is successful in pursuing

his grievance through arbitration are job reinstatement and back pay.'
These remedies would have little deterring effect upon employers practicing wrongful discharge,62 the court reasoned, and furthermore the
public policy against retaliatory discharge applied with equal force
to both union and at will employees. 63 Hence, it would be unreasonable
to allow punitive damages to be imposed against the employer of a
nonunion employee, but not against the employer of a wrongfully
discharged union employee.6
60. Midgett, 105 Il1. 2d at 149, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. In the absence of a cause
of action in tort, the at will employees in Kelsay and Palmateer would have been
remediless; this differs from the situation where an employee already has a remedy
through a collective bargaining agreement. In support of this argument, the defendants cited a number of appellate court decisions: Mouser v. Granite City Steel Division of National Steel Corp., 121 Ill. App. 3d 834, 460 N.E.2d 115 (1984); Suddreth
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 114 Il1. App. 3d 396, 449 N.E.2d 203; Deatrick v. Funk
Seeds, 109 Ill. App. 3d 998, 441 N.E.2d 66; Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85
111.App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95. Id. Defendants further cited Lamb v. Briggs
Manufacturing, 700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983), in which the court interpreted Illinois
judicial policy to preclude litigation in the first instance where the discharged employee
is protected by a collective bargaining agreement. However, the court remarked that
if it had jurisdiction to decide as a matter of federal judicial policy whether the
tort remedy should be extended to employees covered by a union agreement, it "might
well find that such disparities between the fruits of successful pursuit of tort and
contractual remedies warranted the creation of an unqualified right of action for
retaliatory discharge". Id. at 1096.
61. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
62. Id. at 149-50, 473 N.E.2d at 1283.
63. Id. at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
64. Id. Justice Moran, dissenting, conceded that punitive damages should be
available to union as well as nonunion employees, but that the issue of whether
the discharge was just should be submitted to arbitration where there is a collective
bargaining agreement with a "just cause" provision. "Requiring union members to
exhaust their contract remedies is part of the trade-off such employees accept in
exchange for the many rights they benefit from-rights not enjoyed by the employee
at-will." Id. at 156, 473 N.E.2d at 1287. According to Justice Moran, if a discharged
employee protected by a union agreement properly follows the grievance procedures,
and if the arbitrator finds that the discharge was unjust, the civil tort action should
be available to the employee; however, if the arbitrator finds the discharge to be
just, the decision should be binding in the absence of collusion between the union
and employer, or other extra-ordinary circumstances. Id. Justice Moran's reasoning

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

The defendants' argument that this cause of action would violate
the federal policy of promoting industrial stability through arbitration in collective bargaining agreements was not adequately discussed.
Justice Ward's response was, "We cannot see any perceptible effect
on the use of arbitration. There is an important public interest in
protecting the rights of workers under the Act." ' 65 The reasoning of

the appellate court in Midgett, which stated that the tort of retaliatory
discharge simply offered an employee one more remedy where the
discharge contravened "strong public policies, as opposed to purely
private interests . . .66
was found to be persuasive. The appellate
court had emphasized that this alternative remedy was especially
appealing and necessary where the employee had alleged collusion' between the union and the employer.67
appeals to a sense of fairness. His position entails a compromise between an ability
to completely circumvent the arbitration process, and a collective bargaining agreement whereby both the arbitrator's findings of fact and his award are to be binding.
On one hand, requiring exhaustion of remedies does not allow the aggrieved employee
to renege on his pledge to arbitrate. It does not compromise the integrity of the
collective bargaining agreement, nor does it ask the court system to assume the additional load of determining employer motivation and justification in discharge cases.
On the other hand, once the employee has fulfilled his contractual obligation to
arbitrate and the trier of fact has determined that the aggrieved employee was
wrongfully discharged, that employee enjoys the same relief as does the at will class
of employees, namely, an action in tort with potential punitive damages.
65. Id. at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. Underlying the Worker's Compensation
Act is the public policy of affording employees with effective and fair means of
receiving compensation for work related injuries without the threat of being discharged.
Id. at 148, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. The court stated that the legislature had clearly
expressed this policy through various provisions of the Act. For instance, the Act
requires employers to inform employees of their rights under the statute by posting
informative notices. Employers are also required to maintain records of work related
injuries and illnesses and file with the Industrial Commission a report of each
accidental death, injury, or illness "arising out of and in the course of the employment resulting in the loss of more than one schedule work day or the inability to
continue performing the duties of his regular job." Failure to file such reports is
a petty offense.
66. Midgett, 105 111.2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284 (quoting Midgett v. SackettChicago, Inc., 118 I1. App. 3d at 9, 454 N.E.2d at 1094).
67. Midgelt, 105 111.2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. (citing Midgett v. SackettChicago, Inc., 118 Ill. App. 3d at 9, 454 N.E.2d at 1094)- Justice Moran, in his
dissent, noted that Midgett's complaint contained no allegations of collusion; the
allegation was first made in opposition to Sackett's motion to dismiss. Midgett, 105
Ill. 2d at 156, 473 N.E.2d at 1287. Furthermore, the allegations were not supported
by facts, but were simply conclusory statements. "[B]are allegations of collusion,
without alleging facts to support such conclusion, are not sufficient to transform
an otherwise barred claim into an allowable civil action." Id.
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The court referred to instances in which the United States Supreme

Court permitted employees protected by collective bargaining
agreements to bring claims based upon employer violations of federally

conferred statutory rights68 embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,69
the Fair Labor standards Act,70 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' In concluding that Midgett had stated a cause of action,

the court noted other jurisdictions" which have held that an employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement may bring a civil tort

action for retaliatory discharge prior to" and separate from any contractual remedies available through the collective bargaining
agreement."7
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Midgett court stated that the basis for a cause of action
in tort for retaliatory discharge lies in the protection of public policy."
2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. See infra notes 87-91 and
68. Midgett, 105 111.

accompanying text.

69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1983).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1983).
72. Midgett, 105 Ill. 2d at 152, 473 NE.2d at 1284. See Puchert v. Agsalud,
67 Hawaii 25, 677 P.2d 449 (1984); appeal dismissed sub nom. Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Puchert, __
U.S. __ , 105 S.Ct. 2693 (1985). Peabody Galion
v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981); Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d
450 (Tex. 1981); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73, 611

P.2d 281 (1930); Judson Steel Corp, v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, 22

Cal.3d 658, 586 P.2d 564, 150 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1978).
73. Answering Sackett's contention that failure to first exhaust the grievance
procedures barred Midgett from a tort cause of action, the court held that a plaintiff is not required to plead exhaustion of contractual remedies in order to bring
a tort claim. 105 Ill.
2d at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1285.
74. Midgett, 105 Il1. 2d at 152, 473 N.E.2d at 1284. In dissent, Justice Moran
*remarked that this decision overlooks the policy consideration in Kelsay, which was
to provide an at will employee with a means of seeking compensation under the
*Worker's Compensation Act free from the threat of discharge. "The employee covered
by a collective bargaining agreement requiring that just cause be shown in order
to terminate a covered employee, is not faced with the same dilemma." Id. at 155,
473 N.E.2d at 1286. "The concept of retaliatory discharge is subsumed within the
just cause provision and is within the power of the arbitrator to consider when determining if a discharge is for just cause." Id. (citing Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
85 Ill.
App. 3d at 402, 407 N.E.2d at 95 (1980)).
75. Id. at 148, 473 N.E.2d at 1283. "The foundation of the tort of retaliatory
discharge lies in the protection of public policy" (citing Palmateer, 85 Ill.
2d 124,
133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880). A minority of courts which recognize the cause of action
for wrongful discharge treat such claims as claims of breach of contract. See, e.g.,
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549(1974). Monge refused.
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The court had pointed out in Palmateer that where the employee's
personal interests alone are jeopardized by the discharge, the tort action
is not available.7" The employee must allege that the discharge contravened a "clearly mandated public policy." 7
But, as the court in Palmateer acknowledged, "[T]he Achilles' heel

to socialize with her foreman and was discharged as a consequence. The court held:
"Termination by the employer of a contract of employment at-will which is motivated
by bad faith or malice, or based on retaliation ... constitutes a breach of the employment contract." Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. However, the cause of action is still
based upon protection of public policy. In Howard v. Door Woolen Co., 414 A.2d
1273 (N.H. 1980), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted the Monge
decision "to apply only to a situation where an employee is discharged because he
performed an act which public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which
public policy would condemn." Id. at 1274.
76. Palmateer, 85 Il. 2d at 131, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
77. Id. at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881. Public policy has been construed to exist
in varying degrees of importance. Only compelling reasons may be deemed worthy
of providing a ground for a cause of action. Id. at 138, 421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan,
J., dissenting). Mere allegations of contravention of public policy may not sustain
a cause of action. See, e.g., Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454
(Iowa 1978); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Geary
v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
The Supreme Court of Oregon has classified wrongful discharge cases into three
categories: (1) the court recognizes a tort action where the employee is fired for
performing an obligation to society (in contrast to an employee fired for pursuing
a private interest.) Thus, the court in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512
(1975), found a cause of action in tort where the employee was discharged for performing jury duty; (2) the tort action is available to in at will employee fired for
pursuing a private statutory right if the right is (a) related to the individual's role
as an employee, and (b) "one of important public interest indicated by constitutional and statutory provisions and case law." Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Or.
-, 689 P.2d at 1297. The aggrieved employee in Brown v. Transcon
Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978), discharged for filing a worker's compensation claim, qualified for a tort cause of action because the statutory right to compensation related to Brown's role as an employee and because the state's worker's
compensation act indicated the legislature's recognition that important public policy
was involved. On the other hand, if the statutory right to pursue does not relate
to the individual's role as an employee, or if an important public interest is not
involved, the at will doctrine applies. Therefore, an employee discharged for insisting
upon a statutory right as a stockholder to inspect the corporate records is not entitled to the tort claim because the right relates to the individual, not as an employee,
but as a stockholder. Campbell v. Ford Industries, Inc., 274 Or. 243, 253, 546 P.2d
141 (1976); (3) where an existing remedy adequately protects the public interest at
stake, an additional remedy will not be granted. Thus, an employee discharged for
complaining of a safety violation was confined to the remedies afforded by federal
and state statutes. Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205
(1977).
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of the principle lies in the definition of public policy."8 Various at-

tempts by the courts to articulate the meaning of public policy have

provided little guidance."

78. Palmateer, 85 Ill.
2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878. Because the concept of
public policy defies precise definition, the court listed a number of instances in which
other state courts have allowed or disallowed retaliatory discharge suits. Id. at 131,
421 N.E.2d at 879. Where courts have allowed the cause of action, the employee's
conduct which motivates the discharge tends to fall into one of three categories:
(1) the employee attempts to exercise a statutorily conferred right; (2) the employee
refuses to commit a crime; or (3) the employee fulfills a statutory duty. Where the
cause of action has been denied, the employee's conduct underlying the discharge

appears to be self-serving. See Hill, Arbitration as a Means of Protecting Employees
from Unjust Dismissal: A Statutory Proposal, 3 N. ILL. U.L. REv. Ill, 141-56 (1982).

Where an employee is discharged for exercising a statutorily conferred right, courts
may find violation of a public policy embodied in the legislative enactment. When
the Supreme Court of Illinois first recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge in
Kelsay, the court found support for its decision in a recent state supreme court case
where the employee, like Kelsay, was fired for filing a workers' compensation claim.
Kelsay, 74 111.
2d at 178, 384 N.E.2d at 357-58. In Frampton v. Central Indiana
Gas Co., 280 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), the Indiana Supreme Court relied
on language in that state's workers' compensation act prohibiting employers from
using any "device" to circumvent liabilities created by the act. The court found that
the threat of discharge was such a "device." Id. at __

, 297 N.E.2d at 428. The defen-

dants in Kelsay attempted to distinguish Frampton on the ground that such a prohibition is not found in the language of the Illinois act. The court dispelled this
argument: "Certainly it cannot be argued that the absence of [such language] ..
•can be interpreted to mean that retaliatory discharge is any less repugnant to the
public policy of this State then it is to that of Indiana." Kelsay, 74 Ill.
2d at 184,
384 N.E.2d at 358. But see Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874,
875, where the Supreme Court of Mississippi refused to recognize the public policy
limitations on the doctrine of at will employment when an employee is discharged
for filing a worker's compensation claim. Mississippi's worker's compensation statute
provides no explicit civil remedy for violation of the act. In Kelly, the court said
that if it were to adopt a public policy exception, it would be expressing a policy
different from the policy expressed in the legislative act. Id. at 877. The court added:
"Neither have the courts authority to write into the statutes something which the
legislature did not itself write therein, nor can they ingraft upon it any exception
not done by the law-making department of the government." Id. at 877 (quoting
Hamner v. Lumber Co., 100 Miss. 349, 417, 56 So. 466, 490 (1911)). Other jurisdictions share this position: Martin v. Tapley, 360 So.2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow
Industries Corp., 364 So.2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears
Oil Co., 300 So.2d 510 (La. App. 1974); Marens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express,
Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961); Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d
122 (1956); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978),
cert. denied 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950).
79. See, e.g., Palmateer,85 Ill.
2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878. "[Plublic policy
concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the State collectively.
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Because the contours of public policy can be defined only on
a case-by-case basis, the employer is often left in the untenable position of wondering whether a discharge for a particular type of
employee conduct may result in tort liability. Because Midgett involved
the same employee conduct found in Kelsay, the filing of a worker's
compensation claim, the court's decision provided no further guidance
as to the scope of public policy.
As a regult of Midgett, union members as well as at will employees
may seek redress in the courts under an action in tort. This decision
was based on the perception that public policy against retaliatory

It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes, and when they are silent,
143, 147,
in its judicial decisions." (quoting Smith v. Board of Education, 405 Ill.
89 N.E. 893 (1950)). "[A] survey of cases in other States involving retaliatory
discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights,
duties and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed." Palmateer, 85 Il1. 2d
at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79. See also Leach v. Lauhoff Gain Co., 51 Ill.
App.
3d 1022, 1024, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147. "Public policy is that principle of the law
which holds, that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency
to be injurious to the public, or against the public good." (quoting People ex rel.
Peabody v. Chicago Gas. Trust Co., 130 111.268, 294, 22 N.E. 798, 803) (1889); "It 'relates
to good morals, natural justice and matters affecting the citizens of the State
generally'." Id. (quoting Chicago and E.I.R.R. Co. v. Rouse, 78 II. App. 286, 290
(1898)); "Public policy is an unruly horse and dangerous to ride." ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1375 n. 9 (1962). The proper source of public policy,
as well as the meaning of the term, are open to question. The Supreme Court of
Illinois in Palmateer recognized three sources of state public policy: the state constitution, state statutes, and when they do not address an issue, judicial decisions.
Palmateer, 85 III. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (citing Smith v. Board of Education,
405 111. 143, 147, 89 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1950)). However, other Illinois Supreme Court
decisions which have stated that public policy is found in the constitution and the
statutes do not mention judicial decisions as a legitimate source of public policy.
Palmateer, 85 III. 2d at 137, 421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan, J., dissenting). See Smith
v. Hill, 12 Ill.
2d 588, 598 147 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1958); Knass v. Madison & Kedzie
State Bank, 354 Ill.
554, 567, 188 N.E. 836, 842 (1933); People ex. rel. Peabody
v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 III. 268, 296, 22 N.E. 798, 804 (1889). Also, Justice
Ryan, in his dissent in Palmateer, refers to the Illinois appellate court decision of
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 6 II1. App. 2d 504, 516, 128 N.E.2d 609, 614 (1955), rev'd
on other grounds, 7 Ill.
2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956), and supreme court decisions
in two other states, Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613
(1948), and Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App. 1977) which state
a general acknowledgment that, regardless of the role the judiciary may assume in
formulating public policy, "the question of public policy is first and foremost a
matter of legislative concern." Palmateer,85 II1.2d at 137, 421 N.E.2d at 882 (Ryan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Abris 3 v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 456
(Iowa 1978)).
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discharge applies equally to the union member protected by a collective bargaining agreement."
However, while public policy applies with equal force to both
classes of workers, the court's ruling fails to acknowledge the disparity
in remedies which were available to these classes prior to the creation
of this new tort. Indeed, the court's rationale in Kelsay for creating
the tort action refers specifically to the plight of the at will employee
who is injured in the course of his employment and is threatened
with discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim. In the
absence of the tort action, such an employee would be remediless.'
On the other hand, the employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement containing a just cause provision is not without recourse
in the absence of a civil tort claim. Protected by the just cause provision, the employee is free to exercise his rights under the Workmen's
Compensation Act without fear that he will lose his job as a result
and be left with no remedy."2
Nevertheless, the majority insisted that the availability of punitive
damages was necessary to deter any employer from practicing wrongful
discharge, and therefore, an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement should not be confined to his contractual remedies under
the agreement.
The majority failed to consider that adherence to the exhaustion
of remedies doctrine need not preclude the "protected" worker from
seeking punitive damages. Upon determination by an arbitrator that
the discharge was unjust, an employee may be entitled to seek damages
in state court in addition to receiving the arbitrator's award.83
The defendants in Midgett argued that permitting an employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement to resort initially to the
courts would greatly undermine the grievance and arbitration procedures. 4 In dismissing these arguments with the simple, unsupported
assertion that, "we cannot see any perceptible effect on the use of
arbitration..
,"
the majority has placed itself squarely in opposition to strong federal labor policy. 86
80. Midgett, 105 Il1. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
81. Kelsay, 74 Ill.
2d at 178, 384 N.E.2d at 357.

AND

82. Midgett, 105 I1. 2d at 155, 473 N.E.2d at 1286. See generally F.
E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1973).
83. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

ELKOURI

84. Midget, 105 11. 2d at 151, 473 N.E.2d at 1284.
85. Id.at 1284.
86. See infra note Ill and accompanying text and text accompanying notes
118-21. See also Justice Moran's dissent, Midgett, 105 I1. 2d at 155-56, 473 N.E.2d

at 1286-87.
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In response to defendants' arguments that federal labor policy
favors arbitration, the majority cited three Supreme Court cases in
which employees protected by collective bargaining agreements were
allowed to bring suit against their employers for violating federal
statutory rights.8 7 These cases, however, are clearly distinguishable in
three respects:88 (1) unlike Midgett which presented a conflict between
federal labor policy and state public policy, all three cases involved
conflicting federal policies;8 9 (2) unlike Midgett, where the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act does not expressly provide access to
the courts, all three cases involved plaintiffs exercising rights under
federal statutes which specifically provided access to the courts;9 0 and
(3) unlike Midgett, where no attempt was made to utilize existing
grievance machinery, in all three cases cited, plaintiffs had exhausted

contractual remedies. 9'

87. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
88. Petition for Rehearing by Defendant-Appellee Prestress Engineering Corp.
at 4, Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill.
2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1985) reh'g
denied.
89. In McDonald, the Court held that arbitration proceedings, and hence the
Full Faith and Credit statutes did not preclude plaintiff from exercising his right
to file suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 286-89.
In Barrentine, the Court resolved a tension between federal labor policy favoring self-government and collective bargaining, as embodied in the National Labor
Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act, and the federal labor policy
of guaranteeing specific substantive rights to covered employees, as embodied in the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734-35.
In Alexander, the Court resolved the conflict between federal labor policy
and the important Congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices
(as expressed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.) Alexander, 415 U.S. 36.
90. See U.S.C. § 1983; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) and (g)
(1982). Two situations may arise which afford the employer an opportunity to argue
implicit legislative intent to exclude civil sanctions for violations of the legislative
act: (1)where, as in Midgett, the statute provides specific sanctions for violations
of the act, but does not provide for civil liability, the employer may argue a presumption that where specific sanctions are enumerated, those not included were intentionally excluded, Kelsay, 74 Il.2d at 180, 384 N.E.2d at 356, and (2) where the
act allegedly violated does not provide civil sanctions, while other acts of the state
which limit the employer's ability to discharge do contain specific sanctions, the
employer may argue a presumption of exclusionary intent on the part of the legislature.
Id. at 181, 195-96, 384 N.E.2d at 357, 363-64.
91. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 286; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 730; Alexander, 415 U.S.
at 39-43.
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V.

IMPLICATIONS

By extending the availability of the tort of retaliatory discharge
to workers covered by a just cause provision in a collective bargaining agreement, the court in Midgett has aggravated the contract-tort
tension. 2 Given an election of remedies, the aggrieved employee may
find the availability of punitive damages attractive. The option for
initial judicial relief may cause a loss of prestige for the union,93 a
loss of effectiveness for the arbitration procedure," and a frustration
of the conservation of judicial resources."
The Illinois employer, faced with the risk of punitive damages96
and possibly the cost of insurance to cover claims of wrongful
discharge,9 7 may look with favor 'to those states which have strictly
adhered to a doctrine of preemption with narrowly defined exceptions.9 8 Thus, the State's efforts to retain jobs in Illinois may be
frustrated. Similar considerations by out-of-state employers contemplating relocation to or expansion in Illinois may also have a future
adverse effect on the State and local economy and hamper and State's
efforts to attract new industry to Illinois and foster job creation. 99
A further burden placed on employers and a further restriction
placed on the freedom to contract is the employee's opportunity to
create job tenure by the filing of a claim under the Workmen's Com92. See generally Richards & DeFranco, Retaliatory Discharge: Its Applicability to Employees Protected by a "Just Cause" Provision, 72 ILL. B.J. 481 (1984).
93. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
94. Id.
95. Petition for Rehearing by Defendant-Appellee Prestress Engineering Corp.
at 4, Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc. 105 Ill.
Id 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1985), reh'g
denied.
96. Palmateer, 85 Ill.
2d at 145, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
"There is the danger that the average jury will identify with, and therefore believe,
the employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled
employees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion." (quotink Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive Exercise Of Employer
Power 67 COLUM L. REV. 1404, 1428 (1967)).
97. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has ruled that the insurance coverage
of punitive damages resulting from violations of the Worker's Compensation Act
does not violate public policy. Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d
675 (Minn. 1981).
98. See, e.g., Henry v. Intercontinental Radio, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 707,
202 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984); Gouveia v. Napili-Kai, Ltd., 649 P.2d 1119 (Hawaii 1982);
Anco Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Freeman, 693 P.2d 1183 (Kan. 1985); Kelly v. Mississippi
Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
99. Palmateer, 85 Ill.
2d at 143, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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pensation Act."' 0 In the aftermath of Midgett, an employee in Illinois
need only file such a claim to create job tenure; thereafter, if his
employer discharges him, regardless of the merits of the discharge,
it will be at the risk of incurring liability for the tort of retaliatory
discharge. 10
Perhaps the most significant result of the Midgett decision,
however, is its impact upon federal labor policy as articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,'12 a case
decided after Midgett.
VI.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

In Midgett the Illinois Supreme Court did not address the question of whether a claim of retaliatory discharge brought to court,
in disregard of a collective bargaining provision which mandated that
such disputes be submitted to a grievance/arbitration procedure, is
preempted by federal labor law. The court has announced that it will
decide this issue in light of the Supreme Court decision in AllisChalmers.03
100. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1977).
Frequently, retaliatory discharge claims are based on allegations of discharge in reprisal
of the filing of a workers' compensation claim. An employer may seek to reduce
his exposure to tort liability by structuring his business in such a way as to escape
the purview of the state's workmen's compensation act, or other such statutes which
confer rights upon employees. For most employers, this will not be possible because
worker's compensation acts are generally written to encompass a broad class of
employees, as is true of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.3 (1983).
101. "Henceforth, no matter how indolent, insubordinate or obnoxious an
employee may be, if he has filed a compensation claim against an employer, that
employer may thereafter discharge him only at risk of being compelled to defend
a suit for retaliatory discharge and unlimited punitive damages, which could well
severely impair or destroy the solvency of small businesses." Kelsay, 74 Il. 2d at
192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (Underwood, J., concurring in apart and dissenting in part).
102.

-

U.S.

..

105 S. Ct. 1904 (1985). The United States Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals, as well as the federal district courts for the southern and central
districts of Illinois have recently held that federal labor law preempts a state action
for retaliatory discharge brought by an employee covered by a collective bargaining
agreement containing a just cause provision where the employee has failed to exhaust

the grievance procedures. Each of these decisions cites Allis-Chalmers. Mitchel v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc., 772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1985); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass
Mfg. Co., Inc., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985); Lingle v. Norge Division of Magiq
Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448 (1985); Daugherty v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 120 LRRM
3417, No. 84-1382 (Sept. 24, 1985).
103. The Illinois Supreme Court will address the issue of preemption in Gonzalez
v. Prestress Engineering, appeal docketed No. 62644 (1986).
In Midgett, the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated appeals from the first and
fourth district appellate courts. See supra text accompanying notes 51-58. In Midgett
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As in Midgett, Allis-Chalmers involved a union employee covered
by a collective bargaining agreement. As part of that agreement, AllisApp. 3d 7, 454 N.E.2d 1092 (1983), the first district
v. Sackett-Chicago, 118 I11.
appellate court had held that the retaliatory discharge claim extended to union
employees. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed this judgment. The fourth district
App. 3d 1167,
appellate court in Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 118 Ill.
470 N.E.2d 663 (1983), had held that union employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement could not bring the tort claim, but rather were required to pursue
the grievance procedure provided in the agreement. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed
this judgment and the cause was remanded. On remand, the appellate court found
in accordance with the Midgett holding, in spite of the intervening Supreme Court
decision in Allis-Chalmers. The Illinois Supreme Court has accepted Prestress' petition for leave to appeal in order to reconsider its decision in Midgett in light of
Allis-Chalmers. Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering, appeal docketed No. 62644 (1986).
Neither employee in Gonzalez had filed a grievance. Midgett 105 11. 2d at 146, 473
N.E.2d at 1282. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court will only need to decide whether
the tort claim is barred by failure to exhaust the grievance procedure established
in a collective bargaining agreement. The court will not need to determine whether
the state claim survives if the grievance procedure is exhausted, although the issue
may be addressed. In the Midgett dissent, Justice Moran stated that once an arbitrator
finds that a discharge was retaliatorilly motivated, the employee should be allowed
to bring the civil action. But if the arbitrator finds that the discharge was for just
cause, the civil action should not be available in the absence of an allegation of
employer/union collusion supported by facts, or other "extraordinary circumstances."
Midgett 105 Il1. 2d at 157, 473 N.E.2d at 1287. Some authors agree. See Silzer,
Workers' Compensation: Retaliatory Discharge Of Employees Covered By A Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70 ILL. B.J. 164 (1981). Other authors take the view
App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95
expressed in Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 111.
(1980), that if the arbitrator's award is facially fair, it should be binding and exclusive. See Pincus & Gillman, The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of Union
Employees: What Effect After the Demise of the "At Will" Doctrine? 59 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1007 (1982-83). While the former view seems to be a fair compromise between federal labor policy favoring arbitration and state public policy interests, the
latter view is in accord with the premise of Allis-Chalmers. If a retaliatory discharge
claim is preempted as a Section 301 suit, federal law governs and state interests are
irrelevant. See supra note 164. The grievance/arbitration process is only one aspect
of the federal administration of collective bargaining agreements. Exhaustion of the
procedure does not alter the character of the claim. The Court in Allis-Chalmers
stated that failure to exhaust the grievance procedure was an additional reason for
finding preemption. It follows that bypassing the grievance mechanism is a sufficient
ground for preemption, but not a necessary one. Allis-Chalmers does not suggest
that "inconsistent local rules" should survive exhaustion of the grievance process.
Such rules would continue to impact upon the uniform administration of collective
bargaining agreements notwithstanding the parties' initial attempt to arbitrate.
Should the Illinois Supreme Court maintain, however, that the tort claim is
separate and distinct from the Section 301 claim, and that the state claim survives
exhaustion of the grievance procedure, the question arises as to whether the arbitrator's
decision should be given preclusive effect in the subsequent judicial proceeding.
[Wihen a dispute submitted to an arbitration is properly adjudicated. . ..
a party to the arbitration may be collaterally estopped from maintaining

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Chalmers funded a group non-occupational disability insurance plan

an action based on any matter within the scope of submission and passed
on by the arbitrators. However, . ..
neither res judicata nor collateral
estoppel can properly be invoked unless the precise question has been or
could have been determined by the award.
6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 128 375-76 (1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Whether a retaliatory discharge claim is within the scope of submission is a
question of the intent of the parties to the agreement. Under Illinois law, the general
rule is that any cause of action may be referred to arbitration, and there are scarcely
any exceptions to this rule. Gerrish v. Ayres, 4 II. 245, 248 (1841). In Gerrish the
defendant erected a dam which resulted in damage to the plaintiff's mill located
upstream. The parties agreed to arbitrate the disputes arising from the construction
of the dam. In compliance with the arbitrator's award, the defendant lowered his
dam and tendered money damages. The plaintiff brought suit for damages allegedly
sustained after the dispute had been arbitrated, contending that only past disputes
had been submitted to arbitration, and that the submission and award did not cover
disputes arising after the arbitration. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that courts
always construe agreements to arbitrate as broadly as the agreement's language and
the parties' intentions will warrant. The court found that the parties must have intended that the submission would end all controversies arising out of construction
of the dam. The court noted that it would have been unprofitable for the defendant
to agree to lower his dam as his own expense, yet remain exposed to future actions
which the plaintiff might bring. The court concluded that "(a) submission . . . of
a specific matter . . which is alleged to be the cause of . . . dispute, and a decision
upon it, would take away all causes of action of which that matter . . . might have
been the foundation." Id. at 249. The court then held that the arbitrator's decision,
and the defendant's compliance therewith, covered the entire controversy, and, "like
the judgment of a court upon a cause of action, bar[red] any and all suits springing
out of that subject matter." Id. Following this logic in formulating a rule of preclusion of retaliatory discharge claims brought subsequent to the arbitration of disputed
discharges, courts could readily find that parties who have agreed to resolve disputed
discharges by arbitration intend that the arbitrator's decision should end all controversies concerning the discharge. This position is supported by the finding in Cook
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Il1. App. 3d 402, 406, 407 N.E.2d 95, 97-98 (1980),
that the issue of retaliatory discharge may be resolved by the arbitrator because such
discharges are "subsumed within the just cause provision of a collective bargaining
agreement." Id.
In some instances, courts have expressed a concern that the arbitration process
does not afford adequate procedural safeguards to warrant giving an arbitrator's
award preclusive effect. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Full
Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) does not mandate that arbitration
awards be given preclusive effect .because arbitration is not a "judicial proceeding"
within the meaning of the statute. McDonald v. City of West Branch, Michigan,
466 U.S. 284, 286-89 (1984). Whether the Illinois Supreme Court should create a
preclusion rule rests upon a weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of the arbitration
process in providing procedural safeguards commensurate with the interests at stake.
Where an employee's federal statutory rights are implicated, the Supreme Court
has declined to give preclusive effect to an arbitration award. McDonald 466 U.S.
284; Barantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alex-
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which was administered by Aetna Life and Casualty Company.1' 4 The
labor contract contained a grievance procedure for resolving disputes
arising out of the agreement.0 5 Following a disabling injury, Lueck
filed a claim with Aetna. 0 6 Dissatisfied with the manner in which
payments were being made, he brought a tort action against his
employer and the insurance company rather than resorting to the
grievance process. 0 7 Wisconsin courts had created a tort cause of action
for the bad faith handling of an insurance claim.108
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act'09 did not preempt the state action because
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, (1974). The Court has stated a number
of reasons why the arbitration procedure is inadequate to protect these rights: (1)
the arbitrator may not be equipped to resolve difficult legal questions outside the
context of "shop law"; (2) the arbitrator is confined to interpreting the labor contract and has no authority to invoke laws which conflict with the contract terms;
(3) the union usually controls the manner in which the employee's grievance is
presented, and because the union and employee may not share the same interests,
the union might not pursue the employee's claim with sufficient intensity; and (4)
factfinding is more complete in a judicial proceeding than in an arbitral proceeding.
McDonald 466 U.S. at 288-291. See also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
In considering whether an arbitrator's award should bar a subsequent claim based
upon a discharge, these same concerns exist. However, if the assertion in Cook is
correct, that retaliatory discharge issues are subsumed within a just cause provision,
these concerns are ameliorated. If the arbitrator is competent to determine whether
a discharge is just or unjust, he is necessarily competent to determine whether a
discharge is retaliatory. If the Illinois Supreme Court should decide otherwise, and
decline to give the arbitrator's award res judicata effect, the question remains whether
the arbitrator's finding of fact regarding the reason for the discharge should be given
collateral estoppel effect. A finding of fact concerning the cause of the discharge
does not require the legal expertise necessary to resolve complex legal questions or
invocation of law outside the context of "shop law". In addition, where the parties
have agreed in writing to submit disputes to arbitration, the risk of deficient union
representation is palliated by the employee's right to representation by an attorney
under the Illinois arbitration statute. The arbitrator has the power to subpoena
witnesses, documents, and other evidence, and may allow depositions to be taken.
The statute entitles the parties to notice and opportunity to be heard, to present
evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. Because determination of the reason for
the discharge does not require legal expertise, and due to the procedural safeguards
afforded both the employer and the employee by the Illinois arbitration statute, the
arbitral finding of the cause for discharge may merit preclusive effect.
104. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1907.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1908.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1907.
109. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982).
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the state action was concerned only with whether the insurance claim
was handled in bad faith, and did not concern the federal question
of whether there had been a breach of the labor contract."10 Therefore,
the state suit was separate from and independent of the Section 301
suit.
Unpersuaded by this reasoning, on appeal the United States
Supreme Court found preemption based on two grounds: (1) that a
uniform body of federal law is necessary to resolve labor contract
disputes and should supersede "inconsistent local rules" and (2) that
federal labor policy favors arbitration as the preferred means of resolving labor disputes."'
In order to effectuate the uniform administration of collective
bargaining agreements, questions of labor contract interpretation such
as the meaning of terms agreed upon and the consequences which
the parties intended should arise from a breach of the contract must
be resolved by federal law.'
Justice Blackmun, writing for a majority of the Court conceded
however that some disputes which tangentially concern a provision
of a collective bargaining agreement may not be preempted by Section 301.'1 Congress did not intend that Section 301 should preempt
those state rules which may proscribe conduct or may, independent
of a labor contract, establish rights and obligations." 4 In an effort
to better define when a state action will be preempted the court formulated the following test: If the state action confers non-negotiable
state law rights on employers or employees independent of any right
established by contract, then there is no preemption. However, if an
evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract, or if the state law purports
to define the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is preSuits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations may be brought
ip any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
110. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1909.
Ill. Id. at 1910. "Pin enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal
labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules." (quoting Teamsters v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)).
112. Allis-Chalmers 105 S. Ct. at 1911.
113. Id.

114. Id. at 1912.
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empted.'"5 This test as applied to the Wisconsin tort action resulted
in a finding of preemption, because, according to the Court, the question of whether the insurance claim was handled in bad faith for purposes of tort liability necessarily required an examination of the intent of the parties." 6 Hence, the evaluation of tort liability required
contract interpretation, which is a matter of federal law.'"
In addition to the Congressional mandate for uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, the Court considered the importance of the role of arbitration in industrial self-government."'
The Court explained that if Section 301 did not preempt such tort
claims, the arbitration process could be easily circumvented, as nearly
any action for willful breach of contract can be framed in terms of
a tort claim. ' 9 In point of fact the court stated, "Claims involving
vacation or overtime pay, work assignment, unfair discharge-in short,
the whole range of disputes traditionally resolved through arbitrationcould be brought in the first instance in state court by a complaint
in tort rather than in contract.""'° As a result, arbitration would lose
its effectiveness and the arbitrator's duty to interpret labor contracts
would be relegated to the courts.' 2 '

VII.

THE IMPACT OF ALLIS-CHALMERS

ON MIDGETT

The immediate impact of Allis-Chalmers on Illinois law will
depend upon the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the preemption principles enunciated in Allis-Chalmers, and as applied to
the facts of Midgett. Other courts' interpretations of Allis-Chalmers
and applications of these standards to retaliatory discharge cases have
22
been inconsistent.'
For instance, prior to Allis-Chalmers, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Garibaldi v. Lucky Food
Stores, Inc.,'2 3 that a state claim of wrongful termination based on
public policy is not preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Manage-

115. Id.

116. Id. 'at 1915.
117. Id.

118. Id. (citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960)).
119. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
120. Id. at 1915-16 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 1916.
122. See, e.g., Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 668 (Ninth
Cir. 1985); Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448 (1985).
123. 726 F.2d 1367 (Ninth Cir. 1984).
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ment Relations Act.' 2 ' Garibaldi, a union employee, alleged that he
was told to deliver spoiled milk.' 29 Instead, he notified health officials,
the delivery was stopped, and Garibaldi was fired thereafter.'" He
pursued the grievance and arbitration procedure in accordance with
the collective bargaining agreement.' The arbitrator determined that
the discharge was for just cause, and Garibaldi brought suit against
his employer in state court.' 28 Under California law, where a discharge
violates a state public policy, the employee has a tort cause of action.'
The circuit court's finding that Garibaldi's claim was not preempted
was based on a balancing of the state interest in enforcing public
policy and the federal interest in regulating the labor field.' 3 The
court found that the state claim was distinct from any claim based
on breach of the collective bargaining agreement and that the state
claim "further(ed) the state's interest in protecting the general publican interest which transcends the employment relationship."''
Subsequent to the Allis-Chalmers decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
in Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp.' stated that California's cause
of action for wrongful discharge previously recognized in Garibaldi
survived the preemption standards set forth in Allis-Chalmers. The court
asserted that California's tort action for a discharge which violated
public policy "clearly implicates 'proscribe(d) conduct', 'state-law rights
and obligations', and 'non-negotiable state-law rights' within the meaning of Allis-Chalmers", and therefore was not preempted. "
The Ninth Circuit's finding of no preemption in light of Allis-

Chalmers is of questionable validity. The Wisconsin tort action in
Allis-Chalmers was also based on public policy considerations.' 34 That
action also "implicated proscribed conduct"-the bad faith handling
of an insurance claim. Furthermore, the cause of action created a
state-law right in the insured to be free from such mishandling of
124. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1374-75.
125. Id. at 1368.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. (Suit was filed for wrongful termination, bad faith, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
129. Id.at 1373.
130. Id.
131. Id.at 1375.
132. 764 F.2d 663, 668 (Ninth Cir. 1985).
133. Id. The court stated "We have . .. never found the state tort protection
(against wrongful termination) waivable or negotiable." Id.
134. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1909. "iTlhe bad-faith insurance tort is of
substantial significance to the state of Wisconsin, which has assumed a longstanding
responsibility for assuring the prompt payment of disability claims."
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a claim, and a state-law obligation on the insurer to process claims
in good faith. Yet, the Supreme Court found the state action to be
preempted by Section 301.'" Therefore, the fact that proscribed conduct, state rights, and state obligations are "implicated" does not
assure against preemption. Furthermore, it is questionable whether
3 6 For
non-negotiable state-law rights were implicated in Garibaldi.'
example, the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers concluded that the state
tort action was in reality a breach of contract claim and that the
parties apparently had been free to negotiate the method in which
insurance claims would be processed." Tort liability for bad faith
handling of the claim therefore depended upon the parties' expectations, which must be discerned by "federal contract law."'138
Thus, in addition to a conclusion that a state action implicates
proscribed conduct or non-negotiable rights, one must further determine whether within the meaning of Allis-Chalmers, "evaluation of
the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the
terms of the labor contract." ' 39 If it is necessary to interpret the terms
of the contract in order to determine whether the employer is liable
under the state action, the action is preempted because labor contract interpretation, according to Allis-Chalmers, is a matter of federal
law. 140
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,' the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois applied the
preemption standards of Allis-Chalmers to facts similar to those in
Midgett, and, unlike the Ninth Circuit Court in Harper, concluded
that a tort action for retaliatory discharge was preempted by Section
301 where a collective bargaining agreement contained a just cause
provision.' 4 2 The court reasoned that the retaliatory discharge claim
was "inextricably intertwined" with the just cause provision of the
labor contract,' 4 3 and that the state claim "would effect the 'legal
135. Id. at 1915.
136. Even if a state law confers non-negotiable rights, Allis-Chalmers suggests
that the law may be preempted if it interferes with uniform contract interpretation.
"We pass no judgment on whether an independent, non-negotiable, state-imposed
duty which does not create similar problems of contract interpretation would be
preempted under similar circumstances." Id. at 1914 n. 11 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 1914-15.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1912.
140. Id.

141. 618 F. Supp. 1448 (1985).
142. Id. at 1449.
143. Id.
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consequences [which] were intended to flow from breaches of [the]
agreement'."" 4 The court noted that the parties had agreed that
discharge disputes would be subject to grievance and arbitration, not
state action, and that potential punitive damages were not the legal
consequences intended by parties to a labor contract."' Hence, under
Allis-Chalmers, the state claim was preempted.'"4
The court's rationale is a sound application of the principles set
forth in Allis-Chalmers, but the Lingle opinion does not explain the
meaning of the "inextricably intertwined" component of the AllisChalmers test. The Allis-Chalmers test focuses on "whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration
of the terms of the labor contract. If the state law purports to define
the meaning of the contract relationship, that law is preempted.""
These vague and unexplained provisions of the test as enunciated
by Allis-Chalmers and followed by Lingle must be examined with
reference to the overriding purpose of preemption under Section 301
of the LMRA. That purpose is to carry out Congress' intent that
collective bargaining agreements should be administered uniformly,
and therefore inconsistent state laws which substantially impact upon
these agreements should be preempted.'"4
The Allis-Chalmers analysis suggests that a state action may be
"inextricably intertwined" with a collective bargaining agreement in
two ways. First, if liability under the tort claim is dependent upon
the terms of the agreement, then the tort claim and the agreement
are inextricably intertwined and the action is preempted because it
requires interpretation of the terms of the contract. Secondly, the
employment relationship consists of the rights and duties of the
employer and employees. These rights and duties are defined by the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. If the state action
attempts to alter or substantially impact upon those terms, as, for
example, by imposing an additional duty on one of the parties, then
the state action becomes inextricably intertwined with the contract
terms.
If, on the other hand, the state law confers rights independent
of any contractual rights, there is no preemption.'4 ' The Illinois
Supreme Court has stated that the tort of retaliatory discharge is "in144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1912.
Id.at 1910.
Id. at 1912.

RETALIA TORY DISCHARGE CLAIMS

1986:347]

dependent of any contract remedy the employee may have based on
the collective bargaining agreement."' 50 But the Supreme Court in
Allis-Chalmers announced that the question of whether a state tort
claim is "sufficiently independent of federal contract interpretation
to avoid preemption is, of course, a question of federal law."' 5 ' A
state court does not have the authority to make the assumption that
retaliatory discharges are not within the scope of a just cause provision.' 52 Following the logic of Allis-Chalmers, even if the arbitrator
finds'that a just cause provision does not encompass a discharge which
violates a public policy, the question must be asked whether Illinois
law indicates that parties to a labor contract have the power to determine what constitutes just cause for discharge. " ' As previously noted,
the Supreme Court stated that the parties in Allis-Chalmers were
apparently free to determine what would constitute the reasonable
handling of an insurance claim.'" 4 This conclusion was based upon
a finding that the tort claim was in actuality a breach of contract
claim brought in tort in order to provide exemplary damages.'" This
reasoning applies with equal force to a state action for retaliatory
discharge where an employee is protected by a just cause provision
in the labor contract. Admittedly, the purposes of the punitive damages
6
afforded by the cause of action is to protect a state public policy.'
The tort action, then, is simply a way of suing for breach of contract
with a potential of receiving punitive damages in order to protect a
state interest. The claim remains a Section 301 suit for breach of a
labor contract. Therefore, a retaliatory discharge claim is not "sufficiently independent" from a claim for breach of the labor contract
to survive preemption. Rather, the claims are inextricably intertwined.
Having reached the conclusion that a retaliatory discharge claim
brought by an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement

150. Midgett, 105 Ill.
2d at 149, 473 N.E.2d at 1283.
151. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1913 (emphasis added).

152. Id. The Court held that a state court does not have the authority to make
assumptions under state law about the scope of a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement.
153. Id. at 1913-14.

154. Id. at 1914.
155. Id.
156. The Illinois Supreme Court in Midgett asserted that the compensatory
damages traditionally available for wrongful discharge would have little impact on
the practice of retaliatory discharge "which mocks the public policy of this State
• ..In the absence of other effective means of deterrence punitive damages must
be permitted.

.

. " Midgett, 105 111.
2d at 150; 473 N.E.2d at 1283 (quoting Kelsay

v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111.2d 172, 186-87, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978)).
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is basically a Section 301 breach of contract claim, the court in Lingle
dismissed the state claim on the ground that Lingle had not exhausted
the grievance procedure."" Thus, the court's holding recognized another
concern voiced in Allis-Chalmers of the need to maintain the central
role of arbitration in resolving labor disputes." 8
The language in Allis-Chalmers is sufficiently broad to invite
various interpretations, as illustrated by the divergent decisions in
Harper and Lingle. In addition, the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers
cautioned that its holding did not mean that Section 301 preempted
every state claim which was somehow related to the terms of a labor
contract,' 59 and that the scope of federal preemption "remain[ed] to
be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis.""' Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Courts for central and southern Illinois have found preemption in cases with fact situations similar to Midgett by applying Allis-Chalmers, 6 the Illinois
Fourth District Court of Appeals continues to uphold the Midgett decision. '6
The district court's decision in Lingle is sound and should be
followed. The facts of Allis-Chalmers and Midgett are quite similar.
Each case involved union employees who were parties to collective
bargaining agreements; in each case the bargaining agreement provided grievance procedures for resolution of disputes arising out of
the agreement, and in each case the employees bypassed the established
grievance procedure and brought state tort causes of action. The most
basic difference between these two claims is that they are based upon
different public policy considerations. The argument for preemption
of a retaliatory discharge claim is even more compelling than the argument for preemption of the Wisconsin bad-faith insurance tort claim
since, as the Court noted in Allis-Chalmers, disputes concerning unfair discharges are traditionally resolved through arbitration.''
In light of the goals of Section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act-uniform administration of collective bargaining
agreements and preservation of the role of arbitration in industrial
self-government, the Lingle decision represents a conscientious application of the Allis-Chalmers preemption analysis to a state claim of
157. Lingle, 618 F. Supp. at 1450.
158. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
159. Id. at 1916.
160. Id.
161. See supra note 102.
162. However, the Illinois Supreme Court will consider the preemption issue
in Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering, appeal docketed No. 62644 (1986).
163. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1915.
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retaliatory discharge when brought by a union employee in disregard
of a grievance procedure established in a collective bargaining
agreement.
VII.

CoNcLusIoN

Traditionally, Illinois has subscribed to the doctrine of at will
employment. However, Illinois was among the first, and remains in
a minority of states which recognize the tort of retaliatory discharge
as necessary to provide a remedy for the employee otherwise remediless.
The judicially.created tort is available only to those employees whose
discharge constitutes a contravention of clearly mandated public policy,
as opposed to purely private interests.
Midgett extended the availability of the tort to employees covered
by a collective bargaining agreement on the theory that there should
be a parity of remedies-namely, access to punitive damages-for both
classes of workers.
Illinois' position presents a conflict between the protection of state
public policy and strong federal labor policy which favors arbitration
of disputes arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, and
uniform interpretation of agreements.
A fair interpretation of Allis-Chalmers reveals that a claim of
retaliatory discharge instituted by an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement prohibiting unjust discharges is, in actuality,
a Section 301 suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
As such, the fact that the federal mandate for uniform administration of these agreements interferes with a state interest in assuring
the free exercise of employee rights under a workers' compensation
act, or with any other state interest, is irrelevant.' 6 Congress has provided that state law must yield to federal law.' 65 In the interest of
uniform labor law and in recognition of the integrity of industrial
self-government, the Illinois Supreme Court should overrule Midgett
to the extent that it is inconsistent with these principles.
BRUCE KELLER

164. Allis-Chalmers, at 1912-13 n. 9 (citing Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders, U.S.
-,
104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984)).
165. Allis-Chalmers, 105 S. Ct. at 1916.

